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BEFORE T H E

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Washington, D. C., March 22, 1918

IN T H E M A T T E R O F T H E

INQUIRY TO
DETERMINE PRICES
FOR

NEWSPRINT PAPER

PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO.N EW YORK

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Washington, D. C, March 22, 1918

IN T H E MATTER OF THE

INQUIRY TO
DETERMINE PRICES
FOR

NEWSPRINT PAPER

PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO.
NEW YORK

T E S T I M O N Y B E F O R E T H E F E D E R A L TRADE COMMISSION T O D E T E R M I N E T H E MAXIMUM
SELLING PRICE O F N E W S P R I N T P A P E R
THE

A N N E X E D T E S T I M O N Y was given before the Federal Trade Commission in a proceeding to determine the
maximum selling price of newsprint paper, pursuant to an agreement which provided for the determination of the price by the
Commission subject to a right of appeal to the Circuit Judges
of the United States for the Second Circuit.
The Federal Trade Commission made no express findings on
the questions covered by the testimony, and fixed a price on newsprint paper in carload lots of $3.10 per hundred pounds. Upon
appeal the Circuit Judges fixed the maximum selling price at
$3.50 per hundred pounds and in doing so made the following
specific findings:
In valuing the capital investment used in producing
newsprint, prices before the present European War
should be adopted.
In ascertaining capital investment, i.e., the present value
of property actually used in paper production, we
exclude timber lands whether owned or leased, also
undeveloped or potential water power, i.e., water
rights; but include mill and town sites, terminal
facilities, and improvements on or development of
natural water powers, together with any investment
by way of actual payment for power rights. The
foregoing allowed elements of capital value are the
"tangibles."
A fair maximum return on said capital in a business of
the hazards proven is 15% per annum.
The Judges found the depreciated present value of "tangibles"
at pre-war prices to be $25,000 per ton of daily capacity and adding 10% for going value and $12,000 per ton for working capital arrived at an investment of $39,500 per ton. They applied
their findings to a plant having a daily capacity of 100 tons as
follows:
The capital invested is 39,500 X 100 = $3,950,000
The fair annual return, 15% =
592,500
To be obtained by selling all of an annual production of 30,000 tons, or a
profit per ton of
1975
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The testimony as printed in the record has been revised only
to the extent of correcting a few obvious clerical errors in
reporting.
G. O. MAY
RECALLED AS A WITNESS, HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY
SWORN, TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
Mr. Wise. Mr. May, how old are you?
Mr. May. Forty-two.
Mr. Wise. What is your occupation?
Mr. May. I am an accountant.
Mr. Wise. And how long have you been in the business of
accountancy ?
Mr. May. Well, including my apprenticeship, it is, let us say,
26 years, 5 years apprenticeship.
Mr. Wise. Where did you take your apprenticeship?
Mr. May. I took my apprenticeship in England in the country
and then went to the office of Price Waterhouse & Company in
London.
Mr. Wise. In England as a prerequisite to admission to your
practice of accountancy there is a necessity for this apprenticeship ?
Mr. May. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wise. You were with Price Waterhouse & Company some
twenty odd years altogether?
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. And you have been in the accounting business ever
since ?
Mr. May. Yes, I have been in Price Waterhouse & Company
ever since.
Mr. Wise. How long have you been in this country?
Mr. May. A little over twenty years.
Mr. Wise. Always with Price Waterhouse & Company?
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. Are you head of the firm now ?
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. Do you hold any positions now?
Mr. May. How do you mean?
Mr. Wise. For instance, in connection with the American Institute of Accountants ?
Mr. May. Yes, I am Vice-President.
Mr. Wise. And you are, I believe, occupying some position
with the Government at the present time?
Mr. May. Yes, I am a Treasury volunteer.
Mr. Wise. You are working for the Treasury Department?
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. In the course of your work in accountancy, what
has been the nature of the work you have had occasion to do ?
Mr. May. Well, our practice is a very general practice. We
have touched almost every line of
2 work.

Mr. Wise. Have you worked for the National Government?
Mr. May. Yes, with the Postoffice Department, and have
done various other things for the Government.
Mr. Wise. Have you worked for any of the State governments ?
Mr. May. Yes, for several of the State governments, and
cities.
Mr. Wise. Municipal governments?
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. Have you had occasion to audit any of the accounts of the railroads of this country?
Mr. May. Well, I think, as a matter of fact, since I have been
with the firm we have audited the accounts of about 35 or 40
per cent. of the railroad mileage of the North American Continent.
Mr. Wise. That includes the Dominion of Canada, the United
States and Mexico?
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. And what has been the extent of your experience
in the industrial world ?
Mr. May. Of course, that is the big thing of our practice. We
are auditors of a lot of large corporations, like the United States
Steel Corporation, but the great bulk of our business is with
small manufacturing enterprises. That constitutes, the small
manufacturers, as much as 40 or 50 per cent. of the total.
Mr. Wise. In your work as accountants do you have occasion
to be consulted on the question of value of properties ?
Mr. May. Well, we do not go into the field of valuation of
properties, but we have a great deal to do with questions of value
as affected by earning capacity.
Mr. Wise. Yes, and with earnings?
Mr. May. And with earnings.
Mr. Wise. Upon the value of the property?
Mr. May. Yes. We have acted for a great many people contemplating purchasing a business or selling a business, and they
have frequently called on us for advice as to the wisdom of buying or selling property.
Mr. Wise. As a preliminary to that advice, I take it, you have
to make an examination of the books of the properties to determine what is shown on those books ?
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. And in this work have you made a study of the
question of the rate of return on invested capital ?
Mr. May. The question of return on invested capital is a subject that I have given a great deal of consideration to for the last
fifteen years.
Mr. Wise. As to industrial businesses?
Mr. May. Yes. Perhaps I may explain that I approached the
question from an entirely different angle from Mr. Erickson.
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I do not claim to have made an exhaustive study of the underlying theories that he has. My ideas are based on practical
experience, and I came in from the standpoint, not originally, of
rate cases or price fixing, but from an entirely different angle.
Up to about ten years ago I do not think my firm were ever
engaged in a rate or price-fixing matter, and since then I do not
think we have been engaged in more than one or, perhaps, two a
year, and my interest in the matter has developed originally from
the fact that there was a tendency to value assets, particularly
mining properties, on the basis of estimating the future earnings
and then discounting those values at a given rate of interest.
Now, we have always been advocates of conservatism in accounting and finance and were satisfied that people were using too
low rates of return in those calculations, and, unfortunately,
some of the States were supporting them—entirely for tax purposes—one of the most extreme cases being Minnesota which
valued on the basis of estimating the future return, and discounting it at 4 per cent. I was convinced you could never get
people to put money into any business of that kind on a 4 per
cent. basis, I was originally interested in that subject largely for
the purpose of convincing our clients it was not wise to establish
any such theories, and later I became convinced that the same
fallacy was being adopted in the regulation of rates, and I felt
sure that the Commissions in fixing too low rates were flying in
the face of an economic fact and going to do more harm in the
long run to the public than to the railroads, and that is how I
became interested in value—from this angle.
Mr. Wise. Now, in the past you have had occasion, I take it,
to audit the books of a good many of the news print manufacturing concerns in this country ?
Mr. May. Yes, we have done quite a number of them. More
of the other paper than of news print, as a matter of fact.
Mr. Wise. In the recent past you have had occasion to make.
a special examination into the accounts of the companies involved
in this particular proceeding, have you not?
Mr. May. Yes, we are doing that now.
Mr. Wise. And as a result of your studies in the whole field
of accountancy and of your particular studies of the companies
involved here, have you formed any opinion as to what is a proper
rate of return upon the investment?
Mr. May. Well, to state what is a fair rate of return today is a
little difficult question, and the immediate effect of war conditions is rather difficult to estimate accurately. Of course, the
answer depends, in some measure, on how you value your property. If you in valuing your property take the highest point of
the present costs you do not have to give the same liberality in
return as you have if you take a lower level as the basis of value.
Naturally the two are always linked up together, but I would say,
based on pre-war conditions, a prospect of a return of 15 to 20
4

per cent. has always been necessary to attract capital into a business of moderate hazards. This, I would say, would certainly
not be more than covered by those rates.
I think that property has to earn that in order to attract capital
into the business. In saying that, I am basing it largely on my
actual experience of cases where even that return has failed to
attract purchasers. You would be surprised if you had seen as
many cases as I have where earnings which showed approximately
15 per cent. had been turned down by people contemplating buying. I was surprised myself, because I approached it purely from
the professional standpoint, earlier in my experience. I have seen
so many now that I am convinced of the fact that that is so, and
in recent years I have given a good deal of thought to the reasons.
I imagine Mr. Wise will want me to state some of the reasons
I have for saying it, entirely from the practical standpoint of
experience.
Commissioner Murdock. Let me follow that. Supposing I came
to you and said, "Mr. May, I wish you would go out here to
Podunk, Indiana, and look over a mill out there I want to buy."
You go and look over the mill and come back and report to me
and say, "They have got $100,000 in that mill supported by
$10,000 earnings, but my advice is not to buy it."
Mr. May. I would say that, but I do not base so much on my
advice as on the number of cases where I reported to people and
they refused to buy.
Within the last sixty days I had a business in New York that
was earning $100,000 a year which had between $600,000 and
$700,000 of assets. Those people could not get a buyer for the
property. Finally it was sold for $500,000. That is an actual
case within the last sixty days. People who have not been
through it do not realize it. That is why I have been concerning
myself with trying to explain the phenomenon.
Commissioner Fort. Do you not consider that now that condition may be worse largely on account of the war ?
Mr. May. As a matter of fact that particular plant had more
opportunities during the war. During the war it will earn a
great deal more than in normal conditions.
Commissioner Fort. You do not think conditions as to the
uncertainty of business, owing to the war, had anything to do
with it ?
Mr. May. No, I do not think so.
Commissioner Murdock. As a matter of fact, the answer you
would return to me in that case, Mr. May, would be this: If the
facts were verified, showing it is a sure thing that there is
$100,000 in that mill I have looked over, and I found this is the
maximum earning for several years, but there seems to be an
upward tendency in the mill and I think it is going to earn more
in a few years. That is about the way you would report to me.
In other words, in surveying the property for me you would
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not take merely the present into your consideration, but you
would take a survey of the past and just as near as you could
form a survey of the future as you were able to in your report
to me.
Mr. May. Of course, if I could put my finger on anything that
was only earning 10 per cent. and I felt satisfied that it would
earn 25 per cent. I would say, go ahead and buy it, but, of course,
that is a rather different question from the proposition of fixing
a maximum rate of return you are going to allow them to earn
in the future.
Commissioner Murdock. I wanted to get it just as simply as
possible.
Mr. May. The more questions you ask the better I will be
pleased, because I do not want to leave any point that is not clear
in your mind, if I can help it.
Mr. Wise. You say that 15 per cent. return is needed to attract capital into an industry of moderate hazards. What would
you say of the paper industry? Does that come into the class of
industrials where the hazards are moderate?
Mr. May. I would say it was an industry of moderate hazards
although not one of the lowest of that group.
Mr. Wise. What would you regard as the hazards of the business ?
Mr. May. Well, first of all, the uninsurable risks, and the
second, which I think has regard to a large part of the industry,
is the fact that it is engaged in a business in one country and
selling its product largely in another country, and is, therefore,
subject to the operation of the fiscal policy of the two different
countries and to the elements of government control by two different governments whose interests may not always be identical;
that is a distinct hazard in the business.
Then there is another equally important hazard in it, and that
is the fact that it takes such a large return in proportion to the
sales. If you have a business with sales of four or five times the
capital you can always provide the return on capital by a reasonable percentage of the sales, and nobody would say this is an
exorbitant return on your investment, but when you have to get
a large percentage on your sales, people are always apt to say,
"Why, half the selling price is profit, or 25 per cent. is profit;
that must be too much." Whereas it is not at all necessarily so
in an industry like this where the capital is large in proportion
to the sales, and 20 per cent. or 25 per cent. profit on sales would
not be anything like as remunerative as 2 or 3 per cent. profit is
to John Wanamaker, Sears Roebuck, or Woolworth, or any of
those people. Therefore, I always feel where they have to have
a large investment in proportion to the sales it detracts from the
attractiveness of the investment.
Mr. Wise. Well, what is the basis of your calculation for your
return?
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Mr. May. The investment value of the property. I noticed
Mr. Erickson discusses the question to some extent from the
standpoint of bonds and stocks, and, therefore, I would like to
say that in my view of the case the controlling factor is the investment value, that is, the total present value of the investment,
and the question whether capitalized by bonds or stocks does not
enter into it in my view of the case at all.
Mr. Wise. Does it make any difference to you how many times
the turnover in that business occurs in a year?
Mr. May. How do you mean ?
Mr. Wise. Sales?
Mr. May. I think it does, in this way. The return must be
based on the investment, but if the turnover is small, as I said,
your percentage of profit to sales looks so high that there is always
a tendency to cut it unduly; that is your hazard.
Mr. Wise. Are you speaking with the idea of only one turnover of capital per annum in a business ?
Mr. May. In this business I suppose you do not turn over your
capital once a year. Comparing the agricultural implement industry and the packing industry it is much more difficult for the
agricultural implement industry to get a fair return on capital
than the packers because the same rate of return would constitute something like eight or nine times the percentage of sales
in the case of the agricultural implement industry that it would
in the case of the packers.
Commissioner Murdoch. Mr. May is speaking of the gross
sales as contrasted with the capital. He is talking about the
turnover.
Mr. May. Yes, the turnover. The turnover is the relation of
sales to capital investment.
Commissioner Murdock. That is, the more rapid the turnover,
the lower the rate of profit on the investment.
Mr. May. No, I do not say that. I say that theoretically they
should be the same, but practically, because a given profit is a
higher percentage of sales, you have more difficulty in getting it.
That is one of the hazards of the business. That is the point I
was trying to make.
Commissioner Fort. Well then, in your idea, the profit should
be the same on every sale of a concern that has but one turnover
per annum as the concern that has five turnovers per annum.
Mr. May. Percentage of investment.
Commisioner Fort. That may make quite a difference.
Mr. May. Of course the percentage of investment should be
the same, although the percentage of sales would be much higher
in the case of the company with a small turnover than the one
with a big turnover.
Mr. Wise. Can you explain that any further:
Mr. May. No, I think that is all.
Mr. Wise. Now you stated, Mr. May, that as a basis of the
7

return you take the investment regardless of how that investment
is placed, whether it is in stocks, in bonds, or part in stocks and
part in bonds?
Mr. May. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wise. In other words, it is no matter whether one company has a $50,000,000 and another a $5,000,000 outlay they are
entitled to the same rate of return?
Mr. May. That is my feeling.
Mr. Wise. I wish you would go right ahead and explain your
position here without my having to prompt you or question you
at all, and testify as to your opinion for a rate of return on the
basis that you have recited.
Mr. May. All right. I hope you will interrupt whenever you
see fit.
In the first place, before I start to discuss reasons for the
opinion I want to emphasize two points, first, that I take it what
we are discussing is a maximum price and that there is no
guarantee you are going to get that price, and that there is no
guarantee of a minimum price. I think that is a fairly agreed
upon point. In the second place, I want to emphasize the distinction between the profits that a business must earn and the
profits which can be distributed to the investors in that business.
A large part of the earnings of every successful company has
to be reinvested in that business, or, as Mr. Schwab put it once,
a dollar for dividends and a dollar for plant, and it is curious
how nearly accurate that is.
In preparing a brief for the Senate Finance Committee on the
excess profits tax payment dealing with that point, I took at random forty companies, railroads, public utilities and manufacturing
companies and miscellaneous companies, and when we checked
all the figures back that were drawn at random it showed over
a five-year period they would actually distribute in dividends
almost exactly 50 per cent., within 1 per cent. of 50 per cent.
of the total earnings in the five years. So if you happen to earn
your 15 per cent. or 20 per cent. you won't be able to distribute
year in and year out more than half of it. That is the first point..
Commissioner Murdoch. Mr. May, I do not quite get that in
my mind. What I would like to know is what you are feeding
that 10 per cent. to. If you allow 20 per cent. to go in the business and give 10 per cent. to the stockholders, where does that
other 10 per cent. go ?
Mr. May. It goes to build up the business. Of course, it ultimately accrues directly or indirectly to the benefit of the stockholder. There is no doubt about that. As long as he gets only
half distributed in cash he feels that the other half is going to
build up the business. It may or may not. Some do get it.
Commissioner Murdoch. The ordinary method, as I have observed it, is to divert that 10 per cent. which is not distributed
as dividends into some reserve fund or surplus.
8

Mr. May. Yes, that is so, but my experience is that a man is
attracted if he thinks he has a fair prospect of being able to get
that 15 or 20 per cent. out of the business, half in cash and half
in equities piling up for the future. That is the way he sizes
it up, as far as my experience goes.
Commissioner Fort. That extra 10 per cent. is not distributed
in dividends and you do not care whether it is carried in surplus
or a sinking fund or put into new machinery as long as it is
carried.
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. It is a fact that it is never as such handed back to
the stockholder.
Mr. May. Yes, he has got to leave it in to insure he is still
going to have a cash dividend in the future.
Mr. Wise. He is simply switching his principal all the time
to insure him of his return.
Mr. May. That is right. I have made some examination of the
actual facts. Take the Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the investigation of the Steel Industry. You will find
that year in and year out he said that the price of $28 for steel
rails was the fixed price and that it never varied for years, or
that there were very slight fluctuations. That yielded a profit
of 18 per cent. on the investment to the steel corporation, including 18 per cent. on the relative investment in ore properties
and 18 per cent. on the relative investment in transportation
facilities, taking ore properties, transportation, blast furnaces,
mills, working capital, all along the line invested in turning out.
a ton of steel rails, that the price of $28 yielded a return of 18
per cent. on the entire capital, and yet, so far as my experience
goes, nobody ever seriously questioned the fairness of the price
of steel rails, and it remained unchanged for fifteen years, I
suppose.
Commissioner Murdoch. Of course, it has been traditional in
the United States for thirty years that they sold cheaper abroad
than at home.
Mr. May. That, I think, is one of the things that has often
been said but has never been proven.
Then there is another report, taking the smaller companies.
If you will refer to the Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the investigation of Independent Tobacco Industry at
the time it was being oppressed by the Tobacco Trust, as the
report puts it. It shows for 48 independent companies—
let me see, I have the exact figures here, I think—(referring to
memorandum) an average profit of 15.9 per cent. and it is
rather amazing to note that the Commissioner drew attention to
that fact as evidence of oppression because the Tobacco Trust
itself was earning 40 per cent.
Then there was another interesting thing that developed in the
same connection some three or four years ago. In the course of
9

a study of this question my firm took at random a series of records
at our own offices. There were all kinds of businesses, largely
small manufacturing companies, and we just took them as they
came. We said to a man to go and pick out 200 reports, to take
them straight out of the files, leaving out all public utilities and
non-industrial concerns, pick them out and find out their capital,
and we found the average of those 158 companies was 13.67 per
cent. Those were accounts where we knew a proper provision
had been made for salaries, depreciation and everything, so that
we were dealing with reliable data, and they were just picked
out at random. Those figures were published by one of my partners in the American Economic Review, and I will put that in,
if I may, because I have something further bearing on that.
(The paper above referred to was received in evidence and
marked Manufacturers' Exhibit No. 73, and is as follows:)
MANUFACTURERS' E X H I B I T NO. 73

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
VOL. VI
MARCH, 1916
No. 1
THE COMPARATIVE YIELD ON TRADE AND PUBLIC
SERVICE INVESTMENT

What constitutes a fair return upon capital invested in a business enterprise ? Recent efforts of the Interstate Commerce Commission and of the various state public service commissions to
regulate rates (or more truly to regulate profits) have made this
a vital question. Broadly, the answer is given that such rate of
return must be allowed as will attract capital in sufficient volume
to develop and maintain the particular industry. As a statement
of a ruling principle this is doubtless correct, but it is not a practical answer for, What is the fair rate of return that will attract
capital to the industry? It does, however, suggest the fundamental truth that the investor has a right of selection and is,
therefore, the final regulator; and, though for those who have
already invested, the choice has been exercised, the effect of
regulation on the potential future investor is a question of paramount importance to the public.
The saving to the public which might result from reducing
the limit of return on capital already invested in public utilities
by, say, one or two per cent., considered by itself, is doubtless
a notable sum, but it is insignificant if considered, as it should be,
in relation to the value of attracting and inspiring with confidence
the enormous further capital which requires yet to be invested
in the extension of the facilities now established and the development of new ones if this country is to attain its full development and prosperity. So not only justice but self-interest dictates
that the public should not restrict capital already invested to a
rate of return too small to attract new capital.
10

Eventually, if rate regulation is applied consistently, experience will indicate with some measure of accuracy the rates that
are adequate to attract capital to railroad and other public service
securities. In the meantime, however, there is pretty sure to be
much groping around with consequent damage to the public as
well as to the investor. Evidence is not lacking that many investors are inclined, for the time being at least, to allow the
regulating bodies to work out their experiments upon the other
fellow, while they place their money either where it will be as
nearly safe as may be, as in a savings bank or in high grade bonds,
or invest it where it will yield a larger return than it is likely to
yield if invested in enterprises subject to regulation.
Thus the question really turns upon the competition for money.
And money has its law of attraction, operating as certainly as
the law of gravitation. Every investor is seeking safety and
return. One may attach greater value to safety, while another
desires, if possible, a larger return even though attended with a
somewhat higher degree of risk, thus taking the speculative or
gambling chances; and much skill is displayed in devising types
of securities that will appeal to the different classes of investors.
In the present uncertainty as to the maximum rate of return
an investor in a public service corporation should be allowed to
receive (and in passing it is important to note that it is nowhere
proposed to guarantee even a minimum return), it would seem
logical to inquire what return can be secured from investments in
enterprises not subject to public regulation. Many attempts have
been made in this direction with at best but incomplete or indifferent success. It must be remembered that there is a tendency
among regulating bodies to fix a rate of return to be allowed on
the amount actually invested in the business and that, substantially speaking, the intangible values, such as good-will, patents,
etc., so frequently met with in industrial enterprises, and the
so-called franchise and going concern values in public utility companies are to be eliminated from the capital sum upon which a
company subject to regulation may earn a return. The inclusion
of these intangible values, which has been almost universal until
quite recent years, by both utility and industrial companies under
the general heading of property or other equivalent title in corporation balance sheets, renders it impracticable to determine the
rate of return upon the investment even in the case of corporations publishing reasonably full reports. Undoubtedly, the present tendency in the case of new industrial companies is to set out
as a separate balance sheet item the investment in good-will or
other intangible assets, but the number of instances where this is
done is as yet relatively small. It is, therefore, not possible to
compile from the published reports of corporations statistics that
would be upon a basis permitting accurate conclusions to be drawn
therefrom. In so far as these statistics are accessible, whether
found in the form of corporation annual report or of prospectus
11

issued in the flotation of securities, they show with remarkable
uniformity a rate of return in excess of the maximum yet allowed
in any representative case by any commission in determining
rates.
It is true even of our national banks, than which no line of
business is perhaps rightfully regarded as more safe. The Comptroller of the Currency reports that the net earnings upon the
capital and surplus of all the national banks averaged 8.64 per
cent. for the forty-five years ending June 30, 1914. In only two
of the last seven years of this period have the earnings ranged
below this general average, and then but slightly, while the average for the seven years is 8.98 per cent. It will be observed that
this rate of earnings is upon the surplus as well as upon the capital and if it is objected that bank surpluses are frequently understated and that secret reserves commonly exist, it is sufficient to
say in reply that in so far as this may be true, the profits must
have been understated by an equal amount and therefore the.
rate of earnings stated by the Comptroller of the Currency should,
if anything, be increased.
In an effort to supplement the meager data obtainable from
published records, I have made a study of a number of audit
reports prepared by my firm with a view to determining in each
case, so far as could be done, the investment exclusive of intangible assets of the character above mentioned, the return, and
the resulting rate. The reports were selected purely at random
from our files, excluding only those upon enterprises subject to
regulation or otherwise outside the field of inquiry, such as reports upon governmental bodies, charitable institutions and the
like. It was necessary to discard a considerable proportion of
the reports selected for examination principally because of their
failure to disclose the measure of the intangible values included
among the assets. This process of elimination, however, left
158 reports showing the amount of the investment and the profits,
after payment of operating and management expenses, earned
by enterprises engaged in a wide range of business activities and
scattered throughout the United States. The contents of individual reports and the identity of the clients must, of course, be
withheld, but certain group generalizations can be made without
violation of professional confidence; and I trust they will throw
some light upon the return earned by capital invested in lines of
business open to competition but not subject to governmental
regulation of rates or earnings.
It may be objected that an accountant's reports are likely to
be confined to the more prosperous concerns and will not for
this reason give a fair indication of general conditions. The
premise here is correct only in part. Every important accounting firm is brought into contact, sometimes in bankruptcies and
receiverships, sometimes through disputes between owners, sometimes to determine the efficiency of a management or to locate the
12

reason for a falling off of earnings, with enterprises that are
unprofitable. Even were the charge wholly true it would be
relatively unimportant, inasmuch as the regulation of rates is
merely an effort to limit the maximum earnings and does not
concern itself with the failure of a given utility to earn that
maximum.
The aggregate investment represented by the 158 audit reports
was $406,829,358. This relatively small total for so large a
group is attributable to the fact that reports upon the accounts
of most of the very large concerns had to be set aside for reasons
indicated above. The annual profits remaining for the enjoyment
of this capital, after providing for all costs and expenses of
operation and management, including depreciation of plant and
equipment, were $55,613,659 or 13.67 per cent. The periods
covered by these reports are not uniform, but in most instances
the accounts are for the calendar years 1912 and 1913 or for
fiscal years ending in 1913 or 1914, while in a few instances the
period covered is a fiscal year ending in 1912. During this time
business conditions have been generally unfavorable and some
lines of trade have suffered considerable depression. It may,
therefore, be assumed that the profits earned during the past
two or three years have been not more than a fair average; furthermore, as the present study is confined to audited accounts,
the results may be expected to be more accurate than statistics
usually are.
A few of the concerns under review show an actual loss on
their operations. Only four, however, fail to earn any part of
their interest charges, and these have a total investment of only
$1,527,914 and show an operating loss of $26,993. Nineteen
more having an investment of $60,358,131 earned less than 6
per cent. and fourteen of these businesses earned less than 5 per
cent. Of the entire group of enterprises, therefore, twenty-three,
or 14½ per cent. in number, earned less than the usual legal
rate of interest after paying the costs of operation and management.
A further analysis of the 158 reports under examination shows
that upon the invested capital:
In 117 cases 8 per cent. or more was earned
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There appears to be a widespread belief that large corporations
have crowded the small business man, if not to the wall, at least
to the point where he finds increasing difficulty in making an
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adequate profit. Many intelligent persons sincerely believe this
to be true and are deeply disturbed thereby. It is interesting
and perhaps not without significance to find from the reports now
being considered that fifty-nine of them relate to enterprises each
having an investment of $1,000,000 or more and having an aggregate investment of $379,511,380 upon which the earnings
amounted to $51,317,952 or 13.52 per cent. Only one of these
concerns failed to earn any profits, and its loss for the year was
only a fraction over 1 per cent. upon the investment of $1,200,000,
so that its bearing upon the general average is unimportant.
Twenty-five reports relate to businesses having an investment of
$100,000 or less and may, therefore, be taken as indicating so far
as they may go the situation of the so-called small business man.
The total investment in these twenty-five cases was $1,156,827,
while the profits are found to be no less than $324,114 or 28.02
per cent. Another compilation shows that the average return
upon the investments of $500,000 or less was 16.67 per cent.
The smallest investment shown by any of the reports is that of
a retail store employing a capital of $9,250, upon which for the
year 1913 it earned 34.27 per cent. The highest rate of return
in the group is found in a little establishment having an investment of $13,000, while the second in rank employed slightly less
than $51,000. Of the ten instances mentioned above as having
earned over 40 per cent. each, five had an investment of less than
$60,000 and all but two were below $200,000.
In determining the profits of a small business, the question of
management salaries is relatively more important than in a large
one and the thought may arise that a sufficient allowance for this
expense might perhaps reduce largely the profits shown for the
smaller enterprises. To this suggestion, two replies may be
made; first, that a careful effort was made to exclude reports
upon accounts which did not make reasonable provision for management salaries; and, second, that since 1909, when the corporation tax law was enacted, the tendency among the smaller corporations, where the officers are usually the principal stockholders,
has been toward a liberal allowance for salaries and a consequent
reduction of taxable profits. It is not necessary to imply, nor do
I so imply, that by the use of this means there has been any
extensive evasion of taxation; but the corporation tax law permitted a deduction to be made for management salaries and it
has not been customary for corporations either to fail to claim
the deduction or in fixing the amount to err on the low side.
In so far, therefore, as the statistics before us indicate, it is
very clear that the day of the small business is not yet past. The
initiative and enterprise of the man of moderate means still bring,
as they deserve to bring, a reward far beyond anything that may
reasonably be hoped for by the employers of great aggregations
of capital. The figures given for the profits of small enterprises
may seem surprising to many. If this is so it will be largely be14

cause public impressions are based upon profits divided rather
than upon profits earned. In most growing businesses the difference is substantial, as it is seldom desirable or practicable to
distribute the whole of the profits.
Incidentally, it may be pertinent to suggest that the ideal type
of regulation should provide not only rates for the distribution
of profits, but for rates of service that while not unduly burdensome upon the payers should not be reduced except where they
provide a substantial excess over:
(a) a fair distribution of profits to the owners;
(b) a substantial sum for the betterment and surplus to be held
subject to definite restrictions and to be deducted from
the capital sum in any future calculation of return.
It should be borne in mind that the theory of governmental
regulation is based largely upon the assumption that public service corporations, from their very nature, are or should be monopolies, or, at least, not subject to the same competition, quantitatively or qualitatively, as other enterprises; in other words,
that regulation is, to a large extent, a substitute for competition
as the prime factor in the attainment of reasonable rates. And
yet, as indicated below, commissions have been exceedingly loath
to grant to public service corporations a return comparable to
that being earned by unregulated enterprises, even where the
latter are exposed to intense and active competition.
Contrasted with the profits earned by businesses not subject
to regulation, the maximum return thus far allowed by the various state commissions, is, so far as I have been able to ascertain,
only 8 per cent. That is the most the owners can hope for and
in some cases a smaller maximum is fixed. Among the states
in which decisions upon this question have been rendered by
courts or commissions, reference may be made briefly as follows:
Maximum return allowed by state commissions.
(per cent.)
Telephone and
Gas and
Street
Telegraph
Water
Railway
Illinois
8
Kentucky
7
Maryland
8
California
8
Iowa
8
Washington
7
Missouri
6
7
New Jersey
8
8
New York
8
7½
Nebraska
8
The United States Circuit Court7 held in the Northern Pacific
case that 7 per cent. per annum was a fair return, while in the
Arkansas rate case 6 per cent. with a possible 1½ per cent. ad15

ditional in lean years was allowed. Both of these cases were
decided in 1911.
In every comparison of the rates or return, recognition must,
of course, be given to the difference in the conditions affecting
business generally and those under which public utilities are
operated, with the consequent greater measure of confidence displayed by careful investors in favor of the securities of companies in the latter field. At the same time it must be admitted
that this margin of confidence in securities of utilities as against
industrials is diminishing and the marked disparity of even less
than ten years ago no longer exists.
Having in view the earnings of capital in businesses outside the
field of public regulation and the increasing stability of such enterprises, it does not seem too much to say that nothing is definitely settled by the decisions thus far rendered in rate cases.
The commissions and the courts have been feeling their way
among issues too often befogged and possibly with eyes too
constantly fixed upon interest rates and dividends and without
giving sufficient consideration to the speculative element of profit
that has made possible the rapid development of electrical and
other utilities in recent years. It is the desire of every one that
this process of development shall continue unabated. It cannot
continue if capital finds greater attraction elsewhere. Not the
only attraction but certainly one of the most important is the
rate of profit capital may reasonably expect to earn under competent enterprising management.
It is my hope that the facts herein given, culled as they have
been from a group of business enterprises at once too small to
justify the drawing of final conclusions and yet a group much
more extensive in variety of activity and in territory than, perhaps, has heretofore been subjected to a similar study in equal
accuracy of detail, may prove suggestive; and, what is much
more important, I trust what has been said may serve to incite
a more comprehensive investigation of those business facts ordinarily stated in terms of profit and loss.
J. E. STERRETT.

Commissioner Murdock. That is 6½ per cent. to the stockholders and 6½ per cent. to the business ?
Mr. May. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wise. Some of the companies made less than 6 per cent.
altogether and others made as much as 24 per cent?
Mr. May. Some of them made a loss as the actual facts show.
Out of the 158 cases there were 70 that earned over 15 per cent.
Now these companies, as stated, were selected in 1913; they were
not picked out but just taken at random in 1913. I thought that
for this purpose it would be interesting to take as many of those
same companies as I could find and find out what their last report
showed. I was able to find in our office files the corresponding
records for 86 of those 158 companies.
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Commissioner Murdock. As of what year?
Mr. May. The year ending 1916 or 1917. Those 86 companies
in the earlier period averaged 13.11 per cent., and the same
companies in the later period averaged 20.37 per cent. I also
have the percentage here of the individual companies showing
the different ranges in the earlier period. There were 16 earning between 15 and 20 per cent. and 24 earning over 20 per
cent. There are 40 earning over 15 per cent. today and there
are 7 earning between 15 and 20 per cent., and 39 earning over
20, making 46 out of 86 that are earning from 15 per cent.,
and about 60 per cent. of those companies, between 50 and 60,
are companies with a capital investment of under a million dollars. They are not big trusts, they are small and medium size
corporations.
This is another light on the question, and 1 have prepared some
figures which seem to me particularly illuminating in view of the
fact many of the parties to this proceeding are Canadian corporations. Now, Canada's normal source of supply of capital is
Great Britain, and, therefore, it seems to me that figures showing the return in industry in Great Britain, and in countries
capitalized in Great Britain, would be relevant. The London
Economist, which is the best known of the financial journals of
London, gives each year a summary of the profits shown by
corporations whose accounts are published in its columns during
that year. I have prepared the figures from those summaries,
by industries, leaving out the railways, public utilities, mines and
financial companies like banks and trust companies. I have had
them prepared under different groups and I have worked them
out to show the percentage of profit to the total capital, whether
borrowed capital or stock capital, during these years. The averages are as follows: the ending of the year June 30, 1914; the
average of all companies is 11.25 per cent.; 1915, 10.32 per cent.
That is where they felt the adverse effect of the beginning of the
war: 1916, 12.65 per cent.; 1917, 13.27 per cent.
(The paper above referred to was received in evidence and
marked Manufacturers' Exhibit No. 74, consisting of four tabulations, and is as follows:)
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657

£139,144,245

£ 37,939,713
22,996,539
1,335,050
1,125,032
300,000
14,239,160
1,413,462
59,795,289
4.1
4.3
4.7
4.1
5.1
4.4
5.5
4.3

Debenture capital
Average
Amount
rate

£156,656,561

£ 24,464,987
22,693,326
2,302,430
350,000
6,647,271
10.601,666
5,212,597
84,384,285

Preferred
capital

£245,516,887

£ 29,658,693
45,003,174
4,565,317
5,253,300
9,642,346
16,153,399
19,097,152
116,143,506

Ordinary
capital

£ 54,932,543

9,438,754
1,287,543
1,186,892
3,409,521
5,547,255
4,016,390
25,389,872

Profits
after
debenture
£ interest
4,656,316

£

£

5,944,012

1,555,528
988,851
62,747
46,126
15,300
626,523
77,740
2,571,197

Add back
interest on
debentures

£ 60,876,555

£ 6,211,844
10,427,605
1,350,290
1,233,018
3,424,821
6,173,778
4,094,130
27,961,069

Profits
before
interest

£541,317,693

£ 92,063,393
90,693,039
8,202,797
6,728,332
16,589,617
40,994,224
25,723,211
260,323,080

Total
capital

11.25

6.74
11.49
16.46
18.32
20.64
15.06
15.91
10.74

total capital
(borrowed
and stock
capital)

Total

674

Breweries
81
Iron, coal and steel. 75
Motor and cycle... 27
18
Nitrate
11
Oil
27
Shipping
195
Tea, rubber, etc
240
Miscellaneous

Number
of
companies

£139,993,209

£ 32,163,057
22,762,332
510,900
1,197,425
494,092
19,950,977
2,202,497
60,711,929
4.0
4.3
4.7
5.1
5.8
3.2
5.5
4.3

Debenture capital--.
Average
Amount
rate

£248,496,297

£ 28,361,296
46,377,119
5,797,161
4,303,300
8,260,482
16,773,353
24,752,273
113,871,313

Preferred
capital

£157,368,933

£ 21,916,026
23,501,216
4,027,694
410,000
3,510,000
11,828,099
6,583,240
85,592,658

Ordinary
capital

£ 50,559,438

8,390,132
1,369,232
811,185
2,714,973
3,541,003
4,604,953
24,427,497

Profits
after
debenture
£ interest
4,700,463

£

£

5,749,221

1,286,522
978,780
24,012
61,069
28,657
638,431
121,137
2,610,613

Add back
interest on
debentures

5,986,985
9,368,912
1,393,244
872,254
2,743,630
4,179,434
4,726,090
27,038,110
£ 56,308,659

£

Profits
before
interest

£545,858,439

10.315

7.26
10.11
13.48
14.76
22.37
8.61
14.09
10.39

total capital
(borrowed
and stock
capital)

£ 82,440,379
92,640,667
10,335,755
5,910,725
12,264,574
48,552,429
33,538,010
260,175,900

Total
capital

SUMMARY OF CAPITAL AND PROFITS OF ALL COMPANIES WHOSE REPORTS WERE PUBLISHED
IN T H E LONDON "ECONOMIST" DURING THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1915, EXCLUDING
RAILWAYS, PUBLIC UTILITIES, MINES AND FINANCIAL COMPANIES SUCH AS BANKS
Per cent.
(Figures taken from The Economist of July 17, 1915)
of profit to

Total

Iron, coal and steel.
Motor and cycle...

90
73
25
20
Oil
13
29
Tea, rubber, etc.... 152
255

Number
of
companies

SUMMARY OF CAPITAL AND PROFITS OF ALL COMPANIES WHOSE REPORTS WERE PUBLISHED
IN T H E LONDON "ECONOMIST" DURING T H E YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1914, EXCLUDING
RAILWAYS, PUBLIC UTILITIES, MINES AND FINANCIAL COMPANIES SUCH AS BANKS
Per cent.
(Figures taken from The Economist of July 18, 1914)
of profit to
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691

77
67
24
21
19
30
205
248

£138,566,621

£ 30,518,846
15,330,126
422,600
1,333,637
2,057,157
21,907,032
1,486,600
65,510,623

4.2
4.5
5.2
6.4
5.7
4.6
5.9
4.4

Debenture capital
Average
Amount
rate

£181,092,155

£ 25,341,589
18,494,578
3,738,220
460,000
4,988,000
15,625,365
5,607,490
106,836,913

Preferred
capital

£248,656,252

£ 26,744,679
32,982,051
5,968,674
5,567,300
17,400,581
18,913,987
23,308,607
117,770,373

Ordinary
capital

7,516,704
1,900,495
573,408
4,196,369
8,755,390
7,133,309
30,794,583

£ 65,723,710

£

Profits
after
debenture
interest
4,853,452

£ 6,174,133

£ 1,281,792
689,856
21,975
85,353
117,258
1,007,723
87,709
2,882,467

Add back
interest on
debentures

£ 71,897,843

£ 6,135,244
8,206,560
1,922,470
658,761
4,313,627
9,763,113
7,221,018
33,677,050

Profits
before
interest

£568,315,028

66,806,755
10,129,494
7,360,937
24,445,738
. 56,446,384
30,402,697
290,117,909

£

12.651

12.28
18.98
8.95
17.64
17.29
23.75
11.61

total c a p i t a l
(borrowed
and s t o c k
82,605,114 capital)
7.43
Total
capital

Breweries
Iron, coal and steel.
Motor and cycle...
Nitrate
Oil
Shipping
Tea, rubber, etc
Miscellaneous
Total

666

52
53
13
21
15
26
227
259

Number
of
companies

£128,211,057

£ 29,786,939
15,301,879
407,600
1,112,789
1,527,198
19,321,664
2,129,429
58,623,559

3.9
4.4
4.9
4.7
5.5
4.6
5.7
4.2

Debenture capital—
Average
Amount
rate

£160,459,383

£253,102,789

Ordinarycapital

£ 25,915,416
31,305,000
2,982,352
5,513,300
10,936,749
22,106,074
30,837,282
123,506,616

Preferred
capital

£ 20,350,986
16,876,396
1,779,206
460,000
2,518,000
14,606,307
6,407,599
97,460,889

8,890,874
809,811
1,214,910
2,108,772
8,493,319
9,124,088
31,838,176
£ 66,972,414

£

Profits
after
debenture
interest
4,492,464

£ 5,463,602

£ 1,161,690
673,282
19,972
52,301
83,995
888,796
121,377
2,462,189

Add back
interest on
debentures

£541,773,229

£ 5,654,154
9,564,156
829,783
1,267,211
2,192,767
9,382,115
9,245,465
34,300,365
£ 72,436,016

Total
capital

£ 76,053,341
63,483,275
5,169,158
7,086,089
14,-981,947
56,034,045
39,374,310
279,591,064

Profits
before
interest

13.37

7.43
15.06
16.05
17.86
14.63
16.74
23.48
12.26

total c a p i t a l
(borrowed
and stock
capital)

SUMMARY OF CAPITAL AND PROFITS OF ALL COMPANIES WHOSE REPORTS WERE PUBLISHED
IN T H E LONDON "ECONOMIST" DURING T H E YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1917, EXCLUDING
RAILWAYS, PUBLIC UTILITIES, MINES AND FINANCIAL COMPANIES SUCH AS BANKS
Per c e n t .
(Figures taken from The Economist of July 14, 1917)
of profit t o

Breweries
Iron, coal and steel.
Motor and cycle...
Nitrate
Oil
Shipping
Tea, rubber, etc
Miscellaneous
Total

Number
of
companies

SUMMARY OF CAPITAL AND PROFITS OF ALL COMPANIES WHOSE REPORTS WERE PUBLISHED
IN THE LONDON "ECONOMIST" DURING T H E YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1916, EXCLUDING
RAILWAYS, PUBLIC UTILITIES, MINES AND FINANCIAL COMPANIES SUCH AS BANKS
Per c e n t .
(Figures taken from The Economist of July 22, 1916)
of profit to

Mr. Wise. How many companies does that represent?
Mr. May. It represents about 650 companies with a total invested capital of about 550,000,000 pounds sterling.
Mr. Wise. Good, bad and indifferent?
Mr. May. All that are published. I will draw attention to the
breweries, which come at the top. English breweries are notoriously overcapitalized. They were a very, very successful
industry. They were capitalized on the basis of their earning
capacity during their palmy days. Undoubtedly they are overcapitalized. If you leave out the breweries in any year it raises
the average of the rest about one per cent. In my view they are
extremely interesting and I think relevant as regards this proceeding.
Commissioner Murdoch. That is on the aggregate of these
industries, less the breweries, the rate would be for the year 1917,
14.37?
Mr. May. About that. 14.37, if you leave the breweries out.
Breweries only earned 6.7.
Then there is another significant figure, that is, the earnings
of our national banks. The reports of the Comptroller of the
Currency show that the earnings of national banks in the last
fifteen or sixteen years—it does not make much difference what
period you take—they averaged 9.7 per cent. on the total capital
and surplus invested. Now there is a really attractive industry,
the national bank. Your capital is in there and you can take it out
and liquidate it if you do not like that kind of investment. It is
entirely different from locking up property in bricks and mortar.
They are not any good unless they be put to some such use as
you build them for. That has always seemed to me a very good
index and it seems to me is entirely in line with the general conclusion that you reach from studying the industrial businesses
because there cannot be any question as to the attractiveness of
a national bank investment.
Commissioner Fort. Except in one respect, double liability on
stock.
Mr. May. That is true.
Mr. Wise. What is the percentage of loss in that case?
Mr. May. I think that is the key to the explanation of the condition that I have been discussing, and what is the actual reason
for that is significant. The actual losses are less than fivehundredths of one per cent. Yet one of the first things a man
thinks of when he thinks of a national bank investment is the
liability of it and the risks he is running and that influences his
judgment as to the attractiveness of that investment far beyond
the mathematical value of the risk, and that is the clue, I think.
That is the clue to the whole thing.
Take fire insurance. Every man is considered lacking in all
business prudence if he does not insure, yet he is paying double
the mathematical value of the risk for the insurance. Not more
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than 50 per cent. of the premiums paid go to pay losses. I happened to be talking last week to a Mr. Graham Harding, who is an
assessor for Lloyds in London. His firm have acted for Lloyds
for 120 years and he was talking about this business that Lloyds
do in insuring all sorts of extraordinary risks, and he said, of
course, they make some spectacular losses, to be sure, but they
are making all the time spectacular profits—because people are
willing to pay many times the mathematical value of the risk.
I think that is the one factor more than any other that accounts for the high rate of return that you have got to give to
attract capital into industry. I do not know of any single factor
that is more potent. Now, of course, there is a suggestion that
grows out of that, namely, that by our system of distributing
securities you can spread your risks and therefore you do not
sustain those losses. In our country there are two ways of financing industry, practically. One or two men or a group of men
go in and put up all the capital and control the business or else
it is distributed to the public. Now if a few men put it in they
are the men who control it and if they go in the way they look
at it is somewhat like this: Well, we have looked to make a
certain profit and if we make more than that profit it will give
us a little more income, but as we come up the value of the
income is relatively less. If you have an income of $25,000 a
year and increase it to $30,000, you have added $5,000, but you
have not added 20 per cent. to the enjoyments you get out of
life. It is just the same as building a steamer. When you get
up to a 20-knot steamer it costs a lot more money to add a little
speed. The higher you get the less in the way of additional
speed you get for your money. That is the way we live, the more
income you get the less you really get out of it for the additional
income. On the other hand, if they should lose the whole thing,
that is a loss that is far more felt than any small addition to
their income, if successful. Therefore, only a prospect of getting a liberal return attracts them. On the other hand, if you
are trying to distribute to small holders you come up against
another factor, that is, the factor in the high cost of everything
in this country, the high cost of distribution and the high profits
of distributors, and that applies to securities and the selling of
securities. In other words, it applies to the raising of money
just the same as it does to the problem of distribution of commodities. There is the same difference between the prices that
the farmer gets and the price that the consumer pays and
between the cost of money to the industry and the return on the
investment to the ultimate distributees of those securities. The
discrepancy is almost as large in one case as in the other. And,
of course, you have got to make things reasonably attractive to
the individual small holder. In his case his risk is not quite as
large. But there is another factor that operates far more with
him than it does with the big investor. When a few men take
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hold of a business they do not worry much about the hazards of
bad management. They are generally willing to admit that they
can give good management, but the small investor has to take the
risk of bad management as well as risks inherent in the business.
He sees the possibility of loss from bad management. So that
in the long run it does not make very much difference which way
you go about getting capital into the industry because to make it
attractive, you must give just about the same return in the onecase as the other.
Commissioner Murdock. There must be some point, however,,
in your reasoning upon this proposition at which you come to
the conclusion that the rate of return is unreasonably high. Where
does that point arise in your mind ?
Mr. May. When you say rate of return unreasonably high,
that is a somewhat difficult question to answer in connection with
competitive business. My thought is that regulation and protection ought to go hand in hand. If you do not give any protection you are not in a position to insist on regulation. If you
give a minimum of protection you cannot insist on a maximum
of regulation. If you fix a minimum return you can fix a maximum return. If you do not give any sort of protection at all
it is rather difficult for me to see on what you may base any
regulation of return other than a paramount public interest or
something of that kind, of course. All I can see is that in so far
as a regulative body can control the situation they would not do
anything that was calculated to promote extravagantly high returns, and in the interest of the consumer, ultimately, just as
much as of the producer, you have got to fix that fairly high if
you are going to make it a maximum. Commissions may be the
primary regulators but capital is the ultimate regulator because
the necessity of attracting capital into enterprise and keeping
capital in enterprise is, after all, the paramount consideration,
and that, I think, is particularly true when you are dealing with
an industry that is largely outside of your own jurisdiction, as
you are in this case. You cannot compel capital to stay in news
print in Canada by any proceeding in this case if you fix the
return so low as to discourage them from staying in it.
Mr. Wise. You can compel them to stay in the United States ?
Mr. May. By a gradual extension of the powers of the Government which might make the return in all industries unattractive. I mean by that that they would rather stay in the frying
pan than jump into the fire.
Commissioner Fort. There is another situation there. You say
the voluntary bringing of them into another jurisdiction. They
may of necessity, if they wish to carry on their business, be compelled to bring them into another jurisdiction because they have
not enough demand at home.
Mr. May. If you drive him out of the industry, he can go
out of the industry and, of course, a lot of these water power
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companies could turn their service to other uses. They may
have to come in here if they want to stay in the news print
business. If they come into the United States and it should
regulate the return in the industry they would be no better off.
If they should go out of the industry they would go into something else in Canada.
Commissioner Fort. And make a profit ?
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. What I wanted to ask was this. Commissioner
Murdock spoke of the return becoming too high. That is not a
condition that can arise in a competitive field, is it, unless the
competition is wiped out by combination ?
It is a fair proposition that supply and demand is going to
keep down any such abnormal conditions ?
Commissioner Murdock. That law of supply and demand is
occasionally repealed.
Mr. May. If I were a purchaser I would rather take my chance
on having a fairly high maximum and relying on competition
to keep prices down than I would run the risk of a low maximum and a consequent discouragement of capital from coming
into the enterprise. I would rather take my chance on the first.
Commissioner Murdock. Would you stimulate production by
high prices ?
Mr. May. I should.
Commissioner Murdock. Then after you got a stimulated production how would you maintain your high prices ?
Mr. May. You do not stimulate production by fixing high
prices because you do not fix a price. All I would say is you can
avoid discouraging production while preventing prices from going up to a point where they would be prohibitive.
Of course, the excess profits tax and the business profits tax
in Canada operate to a considerable extent as levelers, and I do
not know but what they level down in a way that is more equitable to the community as a whole than the regulation of prices.
The point of view there, in the case of companies that make high
profits, is that it comes to the whole community rather than to
one group of consumers. I do not think it is any detriment to
the consumers. I think it is to the interest of the consumers and
the government in these times.
Mr. Wise. When the Government itself is in the market
buying?
Mr. May. No, I do not mean that.
Mr. Wise. That is quite another proposition.
Mr. May. Yes, that is quite another proposition.
Mr. Wise. When the Government itself is buying an article
and you put the price up high in order to get the tax back the
consumer pays and not the Government. There is not much
profit in that.
Mr. May. Within reasonable limits I believe it is a good policy
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of the Government for the psychological effect. However, that
is a different proposition. The producer's handling the money
adds a little encouragement.
Mr. Wise. He thinks he has it until the tax collector comes
around.
Mr. May, have you given any consideration to the question of
this price or this profit being applied, say, on the whole industry
or on a part of the industry ?
Mr. May. Well, that is, of course, one of the crucial problems;
that is a very critical problem and it depends on a lot of factors
which are particularly numerous just now, with the question of
the curtailment of non-essential industries, which is very much in
the air. The question of production is a factor there, but I would
approach it from the standpoint of a return of between 15 and
20 per cent. to anybody who is within 80 per cent. of the production necessary to fill the demand. That is the way I would look
at that question, but it is a fairly big question and involves so
many considerations.
Commissioner Fort. Would you consider an allowance of 5
per cent. profit on an industry with two turnovers a year a fair
profit ?
Mr. May. No, I do not. Nothing but compulsion or patriotism, I think, would keep capital in that industry very long on that
basis.
Mr. Wise. Have you given any particular thought in your
work on the question of whether or not in figuring the investment
there should be any item included for what is known as the
going value?
Mr. May. Going value or good will ?
Mr. Wise. I distinguish between good will and going value.
Mr. May. All right.
Mr. Wise. In fixing a price do you think that the good will of
a business is to be considered ?
Mr. May. Good will, as I see it, rests primarily on earning
capacity. In determining what the earning capacity shall be you
cannot predicate your action on the capital value of that earning
capacity. I do not think good will enters into it at all. As to
going value in the sense of the value of the developed industry
as compared with the position of an industry that is just completed—a plant that is nothing more than a plant I think, within
reasonable limits—that should be recognized as part of the investment on which a return should be figured, and in this particular case I do not imagine the publishers would dissent from
that view. I recognize that the new excess profits tax law is one
of the greatest hardships that these publishers are suffering from.
Their going value is a great part of their value and the unfortunate terms of the excess profits tax are undoubtedly a very serious
hardship to the publishers,
Mr. Wise. Do you mean if they have included in their state24

ment good will, that when they come to make up their excess
profits taxes it has to be included?
Mr. May. There is no recognition that the established value of
a newspaper is invested capital under the excess profits tax law.
Mr. Wise. That is not good will. Take a newspaper subscription ; it is not good will.
Commissioner Murdock. It is not. (Laughter.)
Mr. Wise. Not all.
Mr. May. I am sorry to say it is, for the purposes of the excess profits tax.
Mr. Wise. But they have spent money in building up, have they
not ?
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. It represents an actual outlay?
Mr. May. I believe the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
feels—
Mr. Plante. Has the Commissioner actually made a ruling on
that?
Mr. May. I think what they are trying to do—
Mr. Plante. Has he made a ruling?
Mr. May. There is no official ruling on it as yet.
Mr. Plante. Why tell us about what somebody is threatening
to do?
Commissioner Fort. It does not affect this case.
Mr. May. I apologize if I have gone off the subject.
Commissioner Murdock. Mr. May, what is your definition of
going value?
Mr. May. I think, as far as going value should be recognized
in a case of this kind, it would simply represent the reasonable
cost or additional value resulting from the act of building up the
plant from the point where the plant is completed to the point
where it has a successful business going. It is a difficult thing to
measure, I admit. In an industry where there is a big investment
like this, of course there is the actual expense and loss of return
during the preliminary period immediately following the completion of the plant. That is the best criterion of it that I think
suggests itself.
Mr. Wise. Do you consider it to be a proper form of accounting for a manufacturer, in an industry such as this, to set up a
charge for depreciation?
Mr. May. Why, yes.
Mr. Wise. How long has it been the custom with accountants
in this country?
Mr. May. Well, it is a development. It is pretty hard to say.
I know, in the early days of my experience here I lost a great
deal of work because I refused to sign accounts as being correct
unless they had provided for depreciation. But it is a development, more or less general, I should say, during the last ten or
twelve years. I would say that the Federal Trade Commission
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itself has assisted the accountants a great deal in spreading the
recognition of it, although, to be perfectly honest, I think perhaps the income tax has done even more to stimulate the practice.
Commissioner Murdoch. It is growing all the time ?
Mr. May. As the tax rate grows, you can rely on its growing.
Commissioner Fort. I did not suppose there was any question
about setting up depreciation.
Mr. May. No; I do not think there is.
Commissioner Fort. Nor is there any question either, in good
bookkeeping, as to setting up depletion—
Mr. May. No.
Commissioner Fort. (Continuing:) Where at the end of a
specified period of time the industry may be depleted so that there
is not any. Now, is there any other way to provide for the carrying of the repayment of the 10 per cent. to the stockholders,
if you keep on paying dividends?
Mr. May. That is the point.
Commissioner Fort. Take the coal industry. Here is a coal
field, say ten acres square. There is a vein running through it.
The coal company is incorporated for a hundred thousand dollars. I make that figure because it is small. The' stockholders
put their hundred thousand dollars in there, and at the end of a
period of twenty years you have exhausted your coal, and you
have paid out your money in dividends, and by methods of
various kinds, taking care of your machinery, and so forth, and
when you get through your machinery is practically junk. Now,
what are you going to pay your capital stock on, if you do not
provide for depletion?
Mr. May. If you pay out all your current earnings, you are
not, strictly speaking, paying dividends; you are paying out of
capital, and it ought to be recognized as such.
Commissioner Fort. Then you would not get any interest on
your capital.
Mr. May. You should get a fair return plus depletion.
Commissioner Fort. Six per cent. does not take care of your
principal ?
Mr. May. Oh, no.
Commissioner Fort. If you get six per cent., and at the end
of a period of twenty years your coal vein is exhausted, how are
you going to pay your stockholders back their money ?
Mr. May. Charge it into the cost, and set aside a fund for depletion.
Commissioner Fort. Depletion; yes.
Mr. Wise. And they have not all done that ?
Mr. May. No.
Commissioner Fort. The result of the investigations we made
here as to the coal industry was that 60 per cent. of the coal
mines of the United States charge neither depreciation nor depletion.
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Mr. May. 1 can believe that is true.
Mr. Plante. They cannot eat the cake and have it, too.
Commissioner Fort. There is a larger percentage on depletion,
but I take the average as to both.
Mr. May. There is one other point that I wanted to bring out,
that I overlooked; that is when we were talking about the question of the capitalization not affecting the amount of return. In
view of what Mr. Erickson said, there is one consideration that
I would like to point out. That is the effect of the excess profits
tax on that question. I am not discussing the question of allowing
that excess profits tax in figuring a return, but I want to point
out that the excess profits tax, which I think we must take to be
a part of our fiscal system for a good many years to come, makes
financing through bonds extremely expensive and almost impracticable. Suppose you had a company that had $1,000,000 investment, and was earning 20 per cent, on the whole thing, that is,
$200,000. It had borrowed half that money at seven per cent.
in interest and discount. Now, its excess profits tax on that basis
would be $40,000, whereas if it were capitalized wholly by stock
its excess profits tax would be only $26,500. Therefore, the additional excess profits tax resulting from capitalizing with bonds
is 40 per cent. of the interest on the bonds; and whatever may
have been the fact in the past, all the considerations based on the
possibility of capitalizing with bonds as to the future have to be
very substantially modified on that account. If the United States
Steel Corporation today could retire a hundred millions of its
bonds by an issue of stock, it would reduce its excess profits tax
by $11,000,000.
Commissioner Murdoch. They do not know that over in Wall
Street yet, do they? (Laughter.)
Mr. May. It is because both here and in Canada it has been
the deliberate policy of the law to base the excess profits tax on
the invested capital after deducting the borrowed capital. It was
deliberately done. It was not done without argument. There
were briefs innumerable submitted on the question, and it was a
deliberate action of Congress here and it is the action of Parliament in Canada, and in Canada the effect is even more marked
than I have cited here, because the Canadian tax is more steeply
graduated. Here they go up from 25 to 35; there they go up
25, 50 and 75; and I suppose if we stay in the war long enough
we will get there too. So the whole policy of capitalizing with
bonds has been fundamentally affected by the passage of that law.
Commissioner Murdoch. That is likely to lead to a quite general retirement of bonds, is it not?
Mr. May. That is undoubtedly so. A number of our clients are
retiring their bonds today, converting indebtedness in various
forms into capital stock so as to get the benefit of the law.
Mr. Wise. So your conclusion on that is that in computing the
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return it should be on a flat rate upon the value of the investment, regardless of the investment?
Mr. May. Yes. The character of the capitalization; yes.
Mr. Wise. The capitalization.
You may cross-examine.
Mr. Plante. No cross-examination.
(The witness was thereupon excused.)
(Thereupon, at 4.30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned until
Tuesday, March 26, 1918, at 2.30 o'clock p.m.)
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